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Bellon v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 45, 117 P.3d 176 (August 11, 2005) (per 
curiam)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
  
 The trial judge, during a murder trial, allowed testimony of a closely-related crime 
committed by the defendant.  The judge admitted the testimony based on NRS 48.035(3), the res 
gestae statute, since the crime was closely related.  On appeal, the State argued that the 
testimony was admissible under NRS 48.045(2) to show a consciousness of guilt. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that once the State has argued at trial that testimony is 
admissible under the res gestae statute, the law does not permit the State to argue the testimony 
is admissible to show a consciousness of guilt, thereby circumventing a Petrocelli hearing. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Robert Linzy Bellon appeals from a murder conviction for which he received a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.  Bellon contends that the district court erred by 
allowing testimony of threats he made against police officers after his arrest. 
 On October 8, 1995, Frank Dunlap was shot in the back and neck while driving three 
acquaintances to a club, Bellon, Elliot, and Benzo.  Bellon was sitting behind the driver’s seat at 
the time of the shooting.  Elliot, who was in the backseat behind the passenger, testified that he 
heard a two loud pops.  After hearing the gunshots, Benzo and Elliot exited the car and ran away.  
Bellon suggested to Elliot that they take the car.  Benzo testified that he heard the shots as well, 
but did not see the shooting. 
 Bellon was arrested in Lake Charles, Louisiana on November 20, 1998, on unrelated 
charges.  When asked whether officers would find anything related to the Nevada investigation 
from a search of his residences in Louisiana, Bellon responded, “[l]ike the murder weapon or 
something like that?”2  Other events related to the Las Vegas homicide of Dunlap also occurred 
in Louisiana including the arrest of Bellon’s girlfriend, Carleen Holland, for accessory after the 
fact to the murder and recovery of Dunlap’s gun from a hotel in Louisiana. 
 After Holland was arrested, Bellon made threatening statements to the Louisiana police 
officers to the effect that he would return from prison in Las Vegas and kill the officer’s children.  
These statements were allowed into testimony by the district court under the Nevada res gestae 
statute.3  It is from the admission of these statements that the Appellant seeks relief.  On appeal, 
                                                 
1 By Wayne Klomp 
2 Bellon v.  State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 45, 5 (August 11, 2005). 
3 NEV. REV. ST. § 48.035(3) (2004) reads: 
Evidence of another act or crime which is so closely related to an act in controversy or a crime 
charged that an ordinary witness cannot describe the act in controversy or the crime charged 
without referring to the other act or crime shall not be excluded, but at the request of an interested 
party, a cautionary instruction shall be given explaining the reason for its admission. 
the State dropped its res gestae argument, instead relying on NRS 48.045(2)4 for admission of 
the testimony, arguing that the threats showed a consciousness of the Appellant’s guilt. 
  
Discussion 
 
 The court held that the State could not change its argument on introduction of res gestae 
testimony, thereby avoiding a Petrocelli hearing.5  At trial, the State argued that the threats were 
admissible because they were so closely related to the offense that the crime with which the State 
charged Bellon could not be referred to without referring to the threats.  On appeal, the State 
argued that the threats were admissible because they showed a consciousness of Bellon’s guilt. 
 In holding that the State could not change its argument, the court rejected both of the 
State’s substantive arguments for admission of the threats.  The court concluded that the 
narrative of the murder could be told without referring to the threats, and reiterated that a witness 
could only refer to an “uncharged crime if it is so closely related to the act in controversy that the 
witness cannot describe the act without referring to the other uncharged crime or act.”6  The 
court further concluded that the threats failed to show a consciousness of Bellon’s guilt for the 
murder, but instead showed his frustration over being arrested. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court committed reversible error by admitting the testimony.  The court 
further concluded the gravity of the error in allowing the testimony of threats was prejudicial in 
nature.  For that reason, the court remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. 
                                                 
4 NEV. REV. ST. § 48.045(2) reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
5 See Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985).  In order to admit evidence of a collateral or prior bad 
act, the prosecution must show that the offense is relevant and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Defendant  de facto committed the offense. 
6 Bellon, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. at 11.  See Bletcher v. State, 111 Nev. 1477, 907 P.2d 978 (1995). 
